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Abstract 
Like many academic disciplines in the twenty first century the humanities have been deeply 
affected by developments in the brain sciences. Conceptually this has meant that some of the 
major preoccupations of the previous century, like those adhering to a Cartesian division 
between mind and body or the psychoanalytical conscious/unconscious duality, have been 
supplanted by a new kind of neurological relation; that is to say, the relation established 
between a diminished mental faculty and the imperceptible governing power of the 
nonconsciousthis. What is presented here is focused on a theoretically contested notion of the 
neurological nonconscious that has produced two differently orientated strands in the 
posthumanities. The discussion focuses on attempts to assimilate a contested understanding 
of the nonconscious in a remodelled cognitive theoretical framework, on one hand, and a new 
materialist rendering of affect theory, on the other. 
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Introduction 
Like many academic disciplines in the twenty first century the humanities have been deeply 
affected by developments in the brain sciences. Conceptually this has meant that some of the 
major preoccupations of the previous century, like those adhering to a Cartesian division 
between mind and body or the psychoanalytical conscious/unconscious duality, have been 
supplanted by a new kind of neurological relation; that is to say, the relation established 
between a diminished mental faculty and the imperceptible governing power of the 
nonconscious. It is not the case, of course, that every humanities scholar has blindly followed 
this trend, but the inclination toward posthumanism, for example, has certainly been shored 
up by a prevailing notion of consciousness grasped as just the tip of an iceberg of underlying, 
insensible neurological processes. The once radical idea that consciousness, formerly 
modelled via cognitive processes like attention, perception and memory, was just a thin slice 
of the action has now become a mainstream concept that infiltrates major debates. The 
nonconscious poses many questions for decades of cognitive work in the humanities and 
dramatically shifts the research focus away from an anthropocentric weltanschauung toward 
nonhuman worlds. Indeed, the concept now figures writ large in wide ranging debates on, for 
example, visual communication (Williams and Newton, 2009), digital technologies (Grusin, 
2010) and the Anthropocene (e.g. Hayles, 2017 p. 34).  
Significantly, the nonconscious also maps on to a more general and influential turn to affect, 
emotions and feelings that initially became prominent in the brain sciences in the early 1990s 
(e.g. Damasio, 1995). This turn has, as such, challenged scholars who are critical of the ways 
in which neuroscience has been seized upon in the humanities (and social theory), prompting 
them to re-evaluate the role of the nonconscious in the study of, for example, discourse and 
ideology; (Leys, 2011, Wetherell, 2012); concepts which have traditionally had a distinctive 
cognitive slant. Others have taken a more balanced viewpoint seeing little difference between 
a neurobiological materialism and critique (Pitts-Taylor, 2016, Sampson, 2016). The 
nonconscious has indeed become a deep seated component of the politics within the 
humanities amid wider concerns about the precariousness of human cognition in technical 
systems (Thrift, 2004; Hayles, 2017 pp. 173-75). To be sure, techno-capitalism itself cannot 
be considered today without a contemplation of the cognitive and affective politics it 
suggests (Karpi, Kahkonen and Mannevuo, 2016). 
Due to the complexity of this disciplinary drama, the aims of this condensed article remain 
fairly modest. What is presented here is focused on a theoretically contested notion of the 
neurological nonconscious that has produced two differently orientated strands in the 
posthumanities. Indeed, before addressing this theoretical division of the neuro-inspired 
nonconscious, it is significant to note that there is more instability than consensus in the 
neurosciences. The popular error of labelling the multiplicity of brain sciences a singular 
“neuroscience” has been acknowledged, as such, in the plurality of neuroculture (Rolls, 
2012; Sampson, 2016). Nonetheless, this discussion focuses on attempts to assimilate a 
contested understanding of the nonconscious in a remodelled cognitive theoretical 
framework, on one hand, and a new materialist rendering of affect theory, on the other. In the 
case of new materialism, it is perhaps sensible to also concede that there is, from the outset, 
“no stable definition of affect” (Thrift, 2007 p. 175). In Melissa Gregg and Greg Seigworth’s 
(2010) key text, The Affect Theory Reader, there is a purposefully incomplete list of eight 
different theoretical angles to affect theory (pp. 6-8).  Here I will simply refer to new 
materialism as just one way to capture a particular kind of affect theory that embraces the 
nonconscious to challenge certain assumptions in cognitive science.1 Although similarity 
influenced by the neurological nonconscious, through its broadening out the cognitive 
theoretical frame, the former strand provides a number of challenges to the ontological (and 
ideological) commitments of new materialism (Hayles, 2017 pp. 65-85). 
What follows is structured around three brief explorations of each strand. First, the article 
explores the differing ways in which the neuroscientific nonconscious has stirred up the 
posthumanities. As said, the enquiry is restricted in scope, but aims to expose some level of 
generality by placing a small range of new materialist work alongside Katherine N. Hayles’s 
recent concept of the cognitive nonconscious expressed in her 2017 book, Unthought: The 
Power of the Cognitive Nonconscious. Second, the article asks if new materialism, as Hayles 
claims, conspicuously ignores conscious cognition or does it offer a more nuanced concept, 
which, as I will argue here, moves beyond the cognitive framework to grasp a different kind 
of thought. Third, and relatedly, the article assesses the value of using a remodelled cognitive 
framework to understand the materiality of relations suggested by the nonconscious. Herein, 
                                                          
1 I have to declare at this point that most of my work to date has focused on a broadly understood new 
materialist approach and affect theory (e.g. Sampson, 2012, 2016). 
contrasting conceptual understandings of matter, information, affect, levels, forces and 
assemblage become the focus. Finally, the piece concludes by cursorily accessing some of the 
key differences between each strand and making a few observations intended for future 
debate.  
The Rise of Neuroscientific Nonconscious and the Humanities 
In order to trace the widespread influence of the neuroscientific nonconscious we need look 
no further than the impact of Antonio Damasio’s (1995) somatic marker thesis. To be sure, 
along with Benjamin Libet (1985) and Joseph LeDoux (2003), Damasio’s Spinoza-inspired 
notion of the enhanced and enmeshed role somatically derived affects play in the processes 
behind reasoning and decision making figures writ large in these two diverging strands of 
interpretation.  
To begin with, Damasio’s work is often cited as support for a principal idea in new 
materialism; that is, despite the humanities’ orthodox fixation with an anthropocentric 
worldview, humans actually arrive “late to consciousness” (Thrift, 2007 p. 186). In other 
words, the human brain is understood to take its time to build consciousness as just one of 
many responses to the dynamics of external environmental stimuli. Drawing on Spinoza, 
Wilhelm Wundt, as well as Libet, Damasio thus enables new materialism to frame the 
immediate experience of consciousness as a radical “backdated illusion” (p. 131). Indeed, 
thinking is not at all limited to the thought inside the brain, but as Thrift argues, Damasio 
provides an understanding of how somatic markers act as a kind of “corporeal thinking” in 
affect theory (p. 187). Through Damasio’s work we further see how the forces of affect 
traverse and remap emotions (Bertelsen and Murphie, 2010 p. 140). Emotion, in this context, 
is a kind of capture of affect in consciousness, but the focus is distinctly less on how these 
maps relate to conventional cognitive processes than it is on the significance of a feely, 
bodily precognition. As Thrift (2007) contends: 
[W]e should… pay more attention to the precognitive. This roiling mass of nerve 
volleys prepare the body for action in such a way that intentions or decisions are 
made before the conscious self is even aware of them (p. 7). 
There is a distinctive nonhuman concept applied to technology in the new materialist’s 
rendering of the affective nonconscious. For example, similarly drawing on Damasio and 
LeDoux, Richard Grusin (2010) offers a theory of affect in relation to the premediated human 
encounters with digital media, following, in part, a neuropsychology approach that insists 
upon: “[T]he inseparability of cognition from affect or emotion, often on the priority of affect 
and emotion to cognition and rational judgment” (p. 78).  
Grusin borrows from Hayles’ (2006) modification of Thrift’s (2004) “technological 
unconscious” transforming it into the neurologically fine-tuned concept of the “technological 
nonconscious” (Grusin, 2010 p. 72).  
The nonconscious relation between human and nonhuman worlds of inorganic matter also 
becomes key to the Deleuze-Spinozan vitalisms of new materialism, by way of “linking the 
movements of matter with a processual incorporeality” (Gregg and Seigworth 6). Affect thus 
becomes the “hinge where mutable matter and wonder… perpetually tumble into each other” 
(Ibid. 8). In other words, affect does not just pass from human body to human body, but 
becomes a nonconscious force of encounter with a dynamic materiality that possesses an 
autonomous nonhuman capacity to act and be acted on. 
It is important to initially note that Hayles’ (2017) concept of the “cognitive nonconscious” is 
also influenced by Libet’s notion of a belated consciousness (p. 44). However, it is 
Damasio’s protoself that provides the core model of how the nonconscious feeds forward to 
consciousness; that is to say, how it “operates at a level of neuronal processing inaccessible to 
the modes of awareness, but nevertheless perform[s] functions essential to consciousness” (p. 
10). Indeed, in this model neuronal processes level up from Damasio’s primary protoself to 
higher levels of a core consciousness (pp. 9-10). At the lower level there is a “kind of sensory 
or nonverbal narrative,” which integrates Damasio’s somatic markers into coherent 
representations of the body, before becoming “melded with verbal content in higher 
consciousness” endowed with “abundant memory, language, and reasoning, narratives” (p. 
10). So, at the top of the stack of cognitive levels is a distinctly human sense of higher 
consciousness “enriched” by the production of a “well-defined protagonist, the 
autobiographical self” and “reinforced through the verbal monologue that plays in our heads 
as we go about our daily business” (pp. 9-10). It is these verbal narratives, represented in the 
mental faculty of the brain that helps humans make sense of who they are. 
Significantly though, Hayles reminds the reader that this levelling up process from proto to 
autobiographical self is not restricted to humans, but can be shared by some nonhumans 
including “many mammals, and some aquatic species such as octopi” (p. 9). To be sure, the 
novelty of Hayles’ concept is found in the expansion it offers of this cognitive levelling up 
process to other broadly defined cognizers who possess analogous interpretational and 
decision-making capacities. Although the starting point is strictly a neurological model, these 
capacities are not restricted to animals with brains, but include other biological cognizers, 
“including those lacking central nervous systems, such as plants and microorganisms” (p. 
15). Moreover, the nonconscious is further extended to the cognitive capabilities of specific 
technical systems, some of which are inclusive of cognitive assemblages that bring together 
humans and technologies via interactions with neuron networks in the brain. This use of the 
term assemblage is important to Hayles given that it enables the humanities to break out of 
the “anthropocentric view of cognition” enabling “bridges” that span “across different phyla 
to construct a comparative view of cognition” (p. 15).  
In spite of these efforts at bridge building, Hayles assemblage theory purposely opens up a 
stark categorical divide between cognitive and noncognitive worlds (pp. 30-33). On one 
hand, there are the cognizers; human and nonhuman actors, including some biological forms 
and computer algorithms, with the cognitive capacity to choose, decide and interpret. On the 
other, there are noncognizers, including inanimate and inorganic materials, such as stones and 
hurricanes, which may well be agents “harnessed to perform cognitive tasks” (p. 32), but are 
nonetheless noncognitive since they lack cognitive capacities. This categorical divide has a 
distinct intention. Significantly, the point is not to…  
… ignore the achievements of conscious thought, often seen as the defining 
characteristic of humans, [but to] overcome the (mis)perception that humans are 
the only important or relevant cognizers on the planet (pp. 10-11).  
As Hayles contends, once this “misperception” is overcome then the humanities can turn to 
new important questions and ethical considerations (pp. 10-11). Indeed, whereas the technical 
cognitions found in AI algorithms, for example, have been commonly, and perhaps 
misleadingly, compared with higher level human cognition, Hayles contends that their traits 
are more analogous to a cognitive unconscious. As she puts it: 
Like human nonconscious cognition, technical cognition processes information 
faster than consciousness, discerns patterns and draws inferences and, for state-
aware systems, processes inputs from subsystems that give information on the 
system’s condition and functioning. Moreover, technical cognitions are designed 
specifically to keep human consciousness from being overwhelmed by massive 
informational streams so large, complex, and multifaceted that they could never 
be processed by human brains (p. 11). 
A major concern of Hayles’ work in the humanities is therefore centred on the increasing 
disappearance of human cognitive consciousness from technical processes.  
This article will persist in probing these two alternative kinds of approaches to the 
nonconscious. But for now some cursory comparisons and contrasts need to be made. 
Notably, both approaches readily align themselves to neuroscientific notions of the 
nonconscious and expand this notion to nonhuman worlds. However, whereas new 
materialism expands the capacity of affect to an inclusive human and nonhuman world of 
agential organic and inorganic matter, the cognitive nonconscious makes a categorical 
distinction between selected cognizant actors and noncognizant agents dependent on their 
capacity to choose, decide and interpret. 
Where is Consciousness? 
Hayles’ (2017) formulation of the cognitive unconscious is based, in part, on a critique of 
new materialism (chapter three). It is worth noting that this critique begins with some 
affirmative observations. For example, the new materialist’s effort to decentre the human 
subject is noted as a welcome move against “human exceptionalism” in the humanities, 
which, she contends, has overly focused on a “privileged special category” imbued with 
language, rationality, and higher consciousness, to the detriment of the human’s “continuum 
with nonhuman life and material processes”(p. 65). Furthermore, Hayles seems to particularly 
admire the strong ontological commitment new materialism has to a conceptual 
foregrounding of a materiality that is vibrant rather than passive, and exists in metastable, 
dynamic processes, and assemblages with transformative potentials. Hayles continues: 
After the baroque intricacies of the linguistic turn, [new materialist] approaches 
arrive like bursts of oxygen to a fatigued brain. Focusing on the grittiness of 
actual material processes, they introduce materiality, along with its complex 
interactions, into humanities discourses that for too long and too often have been 
oblivious to the fact that all higher consciousness and linguistic acts, no matter 
how sophisticated and abstract, must in the first instance emerge from underlying 
material processes (p. 65). 
This initial enthusiasm is, however, a brief concealment of a hefty ontological disagreement 
concerning the ways in which new materialism frames the nonconscious. The main thrust of 
Hayles’ criticism is what she sees as the conspicuous absence of “consciousness and 
cognition” (pp. 65-66). Perhaps this is because of a reluctance, she suggests, on behalf of new 
materialists to “slip [back] into received ideas and lose the radical edge that the focus on 
materiality provides” (p. 66). Nonetheless, Hayles contends that by separating materiality 
from cognition new materialism weakens the case for a new materiality since it “erases the 
critical role played by materiality in creating the structures and organizations from which 
consciousness and cognition emerge” (p. 66). This is indeed a gritty provocation and one that 
new materialism should respond to in full. However, for now this discussion will simply ask 
if consciousness is erroneously or purposely missing from new materialism, or is there a 
more nuanced understanding of how nonconscious affect relates to consciousness.  
At the outset, if we again peruse Gregg and Seigworth’s (2010) Affect Theory Reader we can 
see how Hayles’ suspicions have most probably been fuelled by what appears to be the 
celebratory zeal of some authors who see the role of the nonconscious in one of affects 
theory’s main achievements; that is to say, “affect's displacement of the centrality of 
cognition” (p. 5). To be sure, affect theorists have enthusiastically drawn on various 
neurological conditions like synaesthesia to destabilize the study of discrete “cognitive 
modes” in preference for “sensual interconnection” (Highmore, 2010 pp. 119-20). Moreover, 
Brian Massumi’s influential focus on affective intensities are posited in such a way as to 
“transform”, “translate” or even go “beyond” cognition (Bertelsen and Murphie, 2010 p. 
147). Similarly, Anna Gibbs (2010) argues that affect “prompts a rethinking of just what is 
meant by cognition at all” (p. 200). After affect theory, Gibbs argues, there can be no “pure 
cognition… uncontaminated by the richness of sensate experience, including affective 
experience” (p. 200). 
However, these attempts to weaken cognition do not entirely ignore emergent consciousness. 
Hayles observation of its conspicuous absence from new materialism has been, it would 
appear, somewhat selective. Indeed, through its embracing of the nonconscious, new 
materialism has arguably developed a far more nuanced understanding of cognition. As 
Megan Watkins (2010) points out, although nonconscious affects operate “independently, 
accumulating as bodily memory,” and “may evade consciousness altogether,” they also aid 
cognition and induce behaviour (p. 279). Indeed, this bodily memory – related in so many 
ways to Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis –does not become separated from cognition, 
but purposefully weakens the grip of the cognitive frame on what it means to think. As Gregg 
and Seigworth (2010) argue: 
In practice, then, affect and cognition are never fully separable—if for no other 
reason than that thought is itself a body, embodied” (pp. 2-3).  
Other affect theorists do not entirely disregard cognition either, but see it as the “end 
product;” that is to say, the point at which the intensity of nonconscious affect arrives as a 
“conscious emotion in the mind” (Probyn, 2010 p. 77). Along similar lines, Massumi (cited in 
Thrift, 2007) grasps cognition in the sense that it completes the “capture and closure of 
affect” (p. 180). The key difference here is that rather than seeing higher order cognitive 
processes, like perception, attention and memory, as the end product of a levelling up 
process, affect theory favours a kind of emotional cognition as the most intensive expression 
of this capture. Others, like Lara (2018), explore both the “restrictive capacities of 
consciousness” and the “influence” consciousness has on environmental conditions assumed 
to affect a person (p. 39).  
This repositioning of cognition also presents contrasting alternatives to the important ethical 
considerations Hayles draws attention to. For example, her concerns over the potential 
disappearance of human consciousness from intelligent technical systems draws on Thrift’s 
(2004) technological unconscious as the basis of a model of automated cognition that bends 
“bodies with environments to a specific set of addresses without the benefit of any cognitive 
inputs” (p. 177). On one hand then, Hayles (2017) uses Thrift’s idea to argue for an expanded 
cognitive framework focused on “meaning and interpretations,” which would operate like a 
bridge between the “traditional humanities and the kinds of nonconscious cognitions” 
performed by AI algorithms (p. 176). Such a bridge would bring together the technical 
cognitive nonconscious of the algorithm and “those humans who design and implement 
them” (p. 176). Clearly, there is much to be commended in Hayles’ desire to make the 
humanities position on technology more immediate and less aloof. But arguably, on the other 
hand, Thrift’s technological unconscious presents a more complex account of the role 
consciousness plays in technological systems. It is not simply the case that human cognition 
has been cut of the operations of these technical cognizers. On the contrary, it is more a case 
of a wider capture of thinking that feeds on the precarious weaknesses of a human 
consciousness subjected to techno-capitalism. As Thrift (2007) argues: 
 [C]onsciousness can be depicted as though it hardly existed, as an emergent 
derivative of an unconscious. Yet it is clearly dangerous to make too little of 
cognition, as I perhaps did in some of my early papers. Because it is so weak 
(though hardly as weak as some commentators have depicted it), it has enrolled 
powerful allies which can focus and extend conscious awareness – various 
configurations of bodies and things which, knitted together as routinized 
environments, enable a range of different technologies for more thinking to be 
constructed (p. 6-7).  
It is as a consequence of this capture of thinking that Thrift argues that we need to “pay more 
attention to the precognitive” (p. 7). This is not, then, a technological nonconscious that 
merely usurps the human cognizer. Indeed, it has been argued recently that human emotion 
can, for example, become deeply interwoven with automated financial algorithms (Borch and 
Lange, 2017). On the contrary, the technological nonconscious is a system that taps into 
precognitive affects in order to steer intentions before the autobiographical self has a chance 
to even become aware that decisions have been made. 
On Matter: Information, Assemblages and Contagion 
Hayles (2017) begins her thesis by relocating cognition outside of the cybernetic model of 
consciousness and rejecting the legacy of cybernetics in “the computation of the cognitivists” 
(p. 12). Here again we can grasp the influence of the neurosciences on the cognitive frame as 
it too moves away from the overly exhausted computer/brain metaphor towards a new 
paradigm that encompasses the nonconscious. Following this logic Hayles remarks that there 
is a growing recognition in the neurosciences that neuronal processes are not “fundamentally 
computational” (p. 13). Indeed, there is increasing support for an embodied and biologically 
constituted kind of cognition that is not simply restricted to an image of cognizant human 
thought (i.e. aware, attentive etc.). This leads to an acknowledgement of the differing 
contexts in which cognitive processes are assumed to emerge. The cognitive frame therefore 
expands to include distributed nonconscious neuronal communications between humans, like 
those established via circuits of so-called mirror neurons (p. 48). More profoundly perhaps, 
Hayles notes how these embodied contexts can be extended to include some nonhumans; 
plants, for example (pp. 16-20). Indeed, it is this concept of cognition as “a broad compass” 
that leads her to further incorporate technical contexts into the category of cognizers (pp. 20-
25).  
Evidently, this neurologically-inspired appeal to broader contexts of cognition points to some 
fundamental collisions with new materialism. Particular attention is drawn here, as such, to 
Hayles provocative use of the term assemblage to explain how these broader contexts of the 
cognitive nonconscious are distributed exclusively through networks of cognizers (chapter 
five). To begin with, although Hayles claims to manoeuvre away from computational 
metaphors towards an embodied model of cognition, her concept of cognitive assemblages 
retains many of the conventional metaphorical references to engineering terms to support the 
categorical division between cognizers and noncognizers. Most notably, the 
cognizer/noncognizer categorization is dependent on the role of flows of information and 
information processing (pp. 115-16). As follows, the cognizer actor is made distinct from the 
material agency of the noncognizer since the former can act on information received while 
the latter can only be harnessed as an agent of information flow (pp. 28-29).  
Moreover, albeit recognizing that information is context-dependent (p. 22), Hayles 
remodelled cognitive framework is, on one hand, determined by fairly conventional 
computational operations, such as the levelling up from “layers of interactions from low-level 
choices, and consequently very simple cognitions, to higher cognitions and interpretations” 
(p. 13), and on the other, a noncognitive material world defined by a lack of such operations; 
that is to say, the noncognizer is an agent that cannot process information in order to, for 
example, decide. For example, a “tsunami,” Hayles notes, “cannot choose to crash against a 
cliff rather than a crowded beach” (p. 3). In other words, although human decisions, climate 
change, the self-organising forces of matter that constitute a storm and human death are 
interconnected, the middle two are only regarded as a passive part of an informational loop, 
defined, in effect, by a lack of information processing power. 
Ultimately, Hayles presents a differently orientated materialism, claiming that the cognitive 
nonconscious is all about “matter, energy, and information, [and] not only matter in the 
narrow sense” (p. 218 italics added). Therefore, the categorical border line between cognizers 
and noncognizers only includes plants and technical systems since they “share certain 
structural and functional similarities” with a model of human cognition defined by a capacity 
to act on the “flow[s] of information through a system and the choices and decisions that 
create, modify, and interpret the flow” (p. 116). This ensures that material agents and forces 
outside of these structures must take a backseat to the “cognizers within the assemblage that 
enlist these affordances and direct their powers to act in complex situations” (p. 116). 
There are a few frothy comparisons that can be made between certain aspects of Hayles’ 
cognitive assemblages and new materialist affect theory. For example, the focus on mirror 
neurons in Hayles’ account is fairly reminiscent of Gibbs (2010) work on the processes of 
affective mimicry in which she argues that the “sharing of form comprises information in the 
pre-cybernetic sense” (pp. 193-94). Affective mimicry or contagion, like, to some extent, the 
mirroring neuron circuitry of embodied cognition, becomes an “action on bodies” that in 
some way goes on to not only affect body chemistry, but also affects attitudes and ideas (p. 
194). As Thrift (2007) similarly argues, affective contagion reveals that there is “only a 
delicate separation between one’s own mental life and that of another” (p. 237). Nonetheless, 
the information flows that pass through Hayles’ (2017) imitative cognitive assemblages are in 
sharp contrast to the assemblages of affective contagion. On one hand, cognitive assemblages 
are connected by a series of metaphorical “channels” through which information is 
interpreted. These channels begin with a lower level “signal-response” system like those 
assumed to function in mirror neurons, for example, but have since evolved into a higher 
level linguistic channel (p. 128). In other words, these channels form information loops or 
“network hardware” through which mimicry travels on its way from lower level social 
signals to higher level verbal codes (p. 128). As follows, we find a “trajectory analogous to 
nonconscious cognition developing first, with consciousness emerging later and being built 
on top” (ibid). On the other hand, according to Thrift (2007), affective contagion is 
considered as a mixture of occurrences produced in an encounter between bodies and events 
outside the cognitive frame, including “hormonal ﬂux, body language, shared rhythms, and 
other forms of entrainment” (p. 236).  
Affective contagions are experienced as semiconscious ﬂows of sensation “moving through 
the bodies of human and other beings” rather than information flows in the “thin band of 
consciousness we now call cognition” (p. 236). Indeed, these broadly understood bodies are 
like “receivers and transmitters” in the sense that they perpetually move messages on, but 
bodies not restricted to information flows; they are also receivers and transmitters of feelings 
and affects as well as attentive energy (p. 236). Indeed, a child who mimics an aeroplane, for 
example, does more than simply make a cognitive choice to imitate. The child is exposed to 
an affective force of encounter, which not only affects the child’s desire to imitate, but passes 
on a transformative feeling to other parts of the assemblage. Unlike the context dependent 
nature of cognitive assemblages then, connected by embedded informational channels, affect 
is independent of context. The force of affective encounter is transposed, as such, across 
contexts. 
Probably the most marked differences between cognitive and new materialist assemblages is 
in effect noted by Hayles (2017). Indeed, whereas she sees Deleuze and Guattari’s 
assemblage theory leaning on “connotations of connection, event, transformation, and 
becoming” and favouring “desire, affect, and transversal energies over cognition,” the 
cognitive assemblage aims to offer a broader definition that includes a “provisional collection 
of parts” that are in a… 
… constant flux as some are added and others lost. The parts are not so tightly 
bound that transformations are inhibited and not so loosely connected that 
information cannot flow between parts (pp. 117-18).  
As Hayles puts it, the most “important connotation” of cognitive assemblages is the…  
… implication that arrangements can scale up, progressing from very low-level 
choices into higher levels of cognition and consequently decisions affecting larger 
areas of concern (p. 118). 
There is, then, an important distinction that needs to be made between the levelling up of 
cognitive assemblages and the force of encounter in new materialism. In the case of the latter, 
Hayles points to examples of what she regards as careless new materialist accounts of forces 
that are supposed to work transversally across micro and macrolevels. The issue is, she 
argues, that forces operate differently at certain levels, and therefore need to be approached 
with more careful consideration of mechanism specifics. The microlevels of bacterial life or 
quantum physics, for example, have very different kinds of forces in operation, she claims, to 
those that might occur on a macro socio-political or cultural level.  
Hayles criticism of the forces of new materialism hinges on what she calls the restrictive 
ideological leanings toward “Deleuzian deterritorializations” (p. 73). However, this line of 
argument, focused as it is entirely on deterritorializations, perhaps misses the complex 
relations expressed in assemblage theory. Indeed, with every potential deterritorializing line 
of flight there is the possibility of a territorial refrain or new territorialization or 
reterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987 pp. 310-50). This is not to be misunderstood 
as a material relation in the narrow sense: The force of one object exerting a force on another 
object. Neither is it complete chaos, but rather it concerns complex compositional planes in 
which different kinds of forces are expressed, including those found in far-from-equilibrium 
systems and systems at equilibrium, as well as chaotic and closed deterministic systems.  
Further limitations become apparent in cognitive assemblage theory’s initial commitment to 
Damasio’s levelling up process from proto to core self. This is because the theory present a 
neurocentric model of emergence that ultimately informs the subsequent ways in which 
cognition is distributed to a select group of biological and nonbiological contexts (the 
nonhuman cognizers). To be sure, what is lost in Damasio’s model is an understanding of 
how these exterior, distributed relationalities operate beyond the closed interiority of neuronal 
interactions. As follows, Damasio (2000), like LeDoux (2003), contends that the coherent 
sense of self individual humans experience at the higher level of cognition is an emergent 
outcome of nonconscious interactions located inside the microlevel of synaptic functionality. 
This is not to say that the emergence of the self that says “I” is produced by a brain that is 
entirely immune to implicit affective somatic experiences. Nor is it a self wholly composed 
of purely explicit cognitive functions (perceptions, attention, memory, etc.). On the contrary, 
the core self emerges from nonconscious experiences of the material world in the wider 
sense. However, unlike new materialism, which focuses on nonrepresentational and 
precognitive tendencies of affect, the guiding principal of the protoself takes the form of a 
series of hardwired representations of the organism itself located inside the brain at various 
levels. It is these bodily representations that are supposed to maintain the coherence of self. 
This is what Damasio (2000) considers to be the most likely “biological forerunner” of the 
sense of a “preconscious biological precedent” (p. 21). It is the various neuronal interactions 
between the levels of protoself and autobiographical self that produce more elaborate 
representations experienced at a higher level of consciousness as identity and personhood. 
The sense of self therefore emerges matryoshka-like through a levelling up of representations 
that are interpreted at the higher level of consciousness.  
Similar to Hayles, then, Damasio’s model also seemingly breaks away from the old 
cybernetic models of consciousness, but there is a familiar and problematic retention of the 
metaphorical concepts of information processing and representational storage inherited from 
cybernetics (Sampson, 2016 pp. 126-29). Nonetheless, Hayles (2017) argues that the process 
of levelling up is crucial to the framework of nonconscious cognition. She concludes: 
The specific dynamics operating at different levels provide a way to distinguish 
between material processes and nonconscious cognition as an emergent result, as 
well as elucidating the modes of organization characteristic of 
consciousness/unconsciousness (p. 69). 
 
 
Conclusion 
The focus of this short article has been on a theoretically contested neurological notion of the 
nonconscious that has influenced two differently orientated strands in the posthumanities. On 
one hand, the new materialists and their brand of affect theory have, for most part, welcomed 
a neurologically defined nonconscious as support for the principal idea that the cognitive 
conscious is a late arriver, and as a result, much weaker than the anthropocentric humanities 
had assumed. Indeed, the focus is less on the emergence of consciousness than it is on 
alternative concepts of bodily thought, mind controlling precognition and vulnerabilities to 
affective contagion. More importantly perhaps, and despite drawing on the neuroscientific 
nonconscious, new materialism remains committed to inclusive assemblages of sense making 
that bring together, for example, neurons and the self-organising matter of a storm, without a 
brain. This is a flat ontology that does not preconceive of the ascendency of bifurcated human 
consciousness, but rather looks to transformations that arise through the human and 
nonhuman meso-levels of material relations. As follows, new materialist theoretical 
understandings of nonconscious assemblages foreground the importance of relations of 
exteriority. 
On the other hand, Hayles neurologically-inspired expansion of the cognitive frame beyond 
the human brain claims to get a little closer to the new materialist’s assemblage theory (p. 
117). However, as well as criticising its lack of attention to emergent consciousness, Hayles 
also decries new materialisms overreliance on encounters with ill-defined physical forces and 
for overlooking the detail of specific level processes through which cognition is assumed to 
emerge. Perhaps these are legitimate criticisms, particularly if one agrees with Hayles’ 
assessment that the excesses of Deleuzian terminology can obfuscate the detail of concrete 
examples of force and shroud them in ideological assumptions rather than empirical 
knowledge (p. 79). In many ways though, Hayles has simply replaced the anthropocentric 
structures of the humanities with a neurocentric posthumanities. The ontology of Hayles’ 
cognitive frame thus begins in the microscales of the material brain before it emerges as a 
distributed macroscale consciousness. This neurocentric model of emergence is consequently 
analogically related to broader contexts of neuron-like tendencies in plants and some 
technical systems. This is a levelling up of a metaphorical brain understood as mostly 
determined by relations of interiority; that is to say, these level-interaction neurocorrelates 
established between micro-neuronal transmissions and their subsequent journey to macro 
mental faculties come to define the entire cognitive assemblage.  
Arguably, the entire basis of Hayles’ tripartite diagram of the (human) cognitive frame (p. 40) 
begins from the starting point of the neurological cognitive nonconsciousness and works 
backwards to explain everything that comes before and after. To be sure, this diagram 
positions modes of awareness and material processes on either side of the cognitive 
nonconscious, but the emergent relations that might connect matter and consciousness are 
limited by way of a commitment to flows of information and information processing. Finally, 
the levelling up of cognitive processes between micro and macroscales is perhaps as nebulous 
as the forces of new materialism, but it also discriminates between those things with 
cognitive powers and those things without. Given Hayles own concern for the Anthropocene 
and the new “reality that human actions are unleashing forces far beyond our ability to 
control them” (p. 83), then it would seem that an alternative ethical response might be to 
embrace the forces of this noncognitive world and see them as part of more inclusive sense 
making assemblage. 
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